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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Aiberto Varela-Terna appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to felony driving under the influence, claiming the district
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The state charged Varela-Terna with felony driving under the influence
("DUI"). (R, pp.10-11, 36-37.) Varela-Terna filed a motion to dismiss, asserting
"the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest [him] for Driving Under the
Influence as [his] car was parked in a private residential driveway" and LC. § 188004 "does not include a residential driveway." (R., p.44 (capitalization original).)
The court conducted a hearing on Varela-Tema's motion (see generally
10/29/2012 Tr.), after which it made the following findings of fact
On May 6, 2012, [Varela-Terna] drove his vehicle to his
friend's trailer home located in a trailer park at 2374 E. Iona Rd. in
Bonneville County. Entrance to the trailer park is from E. Iona Rd.
The trailer park has a "L" shaped road which provides access to the
trailers (and a single "non-trailer" residential home). There are
approximately 13 trailer homes within the park and each trailer
home has a driveway with lawn or dirt areas between the trailers
and adjacent to the driveways. The single road within the trailer
park is not a through road and does not travel beyond the trailer
park.
There is some fencing around the perimeter of the park
however there is no fence or gate across the access to the trailer
park. There are no posted signs restricting access to the trailer
park. There is a posted speed limit of 10 mph and a stop sign for
vehicles exiting the park.
No business is conducted on the
premises and the park is solely for residential purposes. While
most of the trailer homes are owned by the residents, the lots are
leased from the owner of the park.
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In arriving at his friend's trailer, [Varela-Terna] drove his car
up on to the lawn or dirt next to the trailer inasmuch as other
vehicles were parked in the driveway. After the vehicle was
stopped and ~arked, a portion of the vehicle extended into the
roadway area_,FNJ
There is no real dispute as to the other circumstances
leading up to [Varela-Tema's] arrest for DUI. Later that night,
[Varela-Terna] and his friend were in the vehicle drinking and
listening to loud music. A neighbor complained to the police about
the music with the police responding shortly thereafter. As an
officer approached [Varela-Terna) sitting in his vehicle, he observed
suspicious movements including [Varela-Terna] quickly sweeping
something off the seats of the vehicle. As the officer spoke with
[Varela-Terna], he believed [Varela-Terna] was under the influence
of alcohol. For purposes of this motion, [Varela-Terna] does not
dispute that he was intoxicated while in his vehicle.
[FNJ The evidence on this issue was disputed. The Court makes
this finding solely for the purpose of determining probable cause
and the finding is not binding on a jury.
(R., pp.99-100).

The court denied Varela-Tema's motion to dismiss, stating:
This Court finds that the dirt area adjacent to the asphalt drive way
[sic] is tantamount to a driveway and cannot be considered private
property open to the public.
However, as noted above the Court found that the back
portion of [Varela-Tema's] vehicle extended beyond the dirt into the
trailer park's roadway. The issue then is whether it makes a
difference for purposes of applying the statute when the parked
vehicle is not entirely within the roadway. Under the language of
the statute, the Court finds that the statute will apply to an
intoxicated motorist even if a portion of the vehicle is parked on
private property not open to the public. The policy behind the DUI
statute should not be considered ineffective simply because a
portion of a vehicle was off the roadway and on private property.
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(R., p.103.) The court also concluded the "roadway within the trailer park
was open to the public, making [Varela-Terna] subject to the DUI statute.
(R., p.104.)

Varela-Terna thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to felony driving
under the influence, reserving the right to appea! the denial of his motion to
dismiss. (12/10/2012 Tr., p.2, L.4- p.6, L.13; R., pp.81-85.) The court imposed
a unified eight-year sentence with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R.,
pp.95-98.) Varela-Terna filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.107-109.)

3

ISSUES
on appeal as:
1.

Should
case be remanded for the district court to make a
finding of fact as to whether Mr. Varela's car was upon the
road in the trailer park?

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Varela's motion
to dismiss?

3.

Did the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a
unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, upon
Mr. Varela following his plea of guilty to felony DUI?

(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Should the district court have denied Varela-Tema's motion to
dismiss because Varela-Terna waived
preliminary hearing and, therefore,
waived his right to move to dismiss the charge on the claimed basis it was
unsupported by probable cause?
2.
Even if this Court considers the merits of Varela-Tema's motion,
has he failed to show the district court did not make the requisite factual finding
or otherwise erred in denying his motion to dismiss?
3.
Has Varela-Terna failed to show a unified eight-year sentence with
two years fixed, with the benefit of retained jurisdiction and subsequent
placement on probation, constitutes an abuse of discretion?

4

ARGUMENT

L
This Court Should Affirm The District Court's Denial Of Vareia-Tema's Motion To
Dismiss On The Basis That Vareia-Tema Could Not Properly Move To Dismiss
For Lack Of Probable Cause After Waiving His Preliminary Hearing
"Unless indicted by a grand jury, a defendant when charged in a
complaint with any felony, is entitled to a preliminary hearing." I.C.R. 5.1 (b). The
purpose of a preliminary hearing is for the magistrate to determine, from the
evidence presented, if "a public offense has been committed and that there is
probable or sufficient cause to believe that the defendant committed such
offense." LC.R. 5.1 (b); see State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 387, 234 P.3d 707,
711 (2010) ("The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine whether there
is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a felony."). "If from
the evidence the magistrate does not determine that a public offense has been
committed or that there is not probable or sufficient cause to believe that the
defendant committed such offense, the magistrate shall dismiss the complaint
and discharge the defendant." I.C.R. 5.1(c).
Varela-Terna waived his right to a probable cause determination at a
preliminary hearing and filed a written acknowledgement, signed by himself and
counsel, that he understood "the right for, the nature of, and the effect of a waiver
of a preliminary examination." (R., p.34.) By waiving his right to a preliminary
hearing, Varela-Terna "waive[d] the right to a probable cause determination
regarding the charged felony."

Stewart, 149 Idaho at 387, 234 P.3d at 711.

"[H]aving waived his right to a preliminary hearing, [Varela-Terna] admitted the
existence of sufficient evidence to find that there was probable cause to believe

5

that he committed the crime of felony [driving under the infiuence]."

!fl

at 388,

234 P.3d at 712. He was not entitled to re-visit the question of probable cause in
the district court by filing a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court's opinion in
Stewart, supra, is on point.
In Stewart, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a motion to dismiss similar
to the one filed by Varela-Terna. The state charged Stewart with felony stalking.

149 Idaho at 385, 234 P.2d at 709. Stewart, like Varela-Terna, waived his right
to a preliminary hearing but, after he was bound over to district court, he filed a
motion to dismiss claiming a lack of probable cause based on his interpretation of
what constituted a "continuing course of conduct" under the felony stalking
statute.

~

at 385-386, 234 P.3d at 709-710.

Although the district court

addressed the merits of Stewart's motion and ultimately denied relief, the Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that Stewart could not "dispute whether
there [was] probable cause to believe he committed the felony charged" because
he "waived his right to a preliminary hearing."

~

at 388, 234 P.3d at 712. The

Court further noted:
The Idaho Rules of Criminal Procedure do not have a prov1s1on
comparable to a motion for summary judgment found in the Idaho
A defendant cannot have a case
Rules of Civil Procedure.
dismissed on the ground that the State's discovery responses show
that it cannot prove the crime charged.
The only somewhat
comparable motion would be a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not show probable
cause to believe that the defendant had committed the felony
charged. Of course, that motion would require that there was a
preliminary hearing.
Stewart at 388, 234 P.3d at 712 (citation omitted).
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Although the district court, citing Stewart, noted that the "[w]aiver of a
preliminary hearing typical!y precludes the right of a defendant to challenge
probable, cause," it nevertheless concluded that "[d]espite the questionable
procedure by which" Varela-Terna challenged the probable cause finding, it had
"discretion and authority under Rule 48(a)(2), ICR to consider a motion to
dismiss, make factual findings, and determine whether those facts constitute
probable cause." (R., pp.101-102.) The district court relied on State v. MartinezGonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 275 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2012), to support its finding of
discretion.

(R., p.102.)

The court's reliance on Martinez-Gonzalez was

misplaced.
In Martinez-Gonzalez, the defendant filed a "motion to suppress or
dismiss, asserting the evidence was obtained pursuant to an illegal traffic stop
and arrest" 152 Idaho 778, 275 P. 3d at 4. More specifically, Martinez-Gonzalez
"argued he was arrested under suspicion of DUI on private property not covered
by the criminal statute and the arresting officer did not have probable cause that
Martinez-Gonzalez was under the influence of alcohol."
denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

kt

The district court

kt at 777,

275 P.3d at 3.

However, nowhere in the Court's opinion is there any indication that MartinezGonzalez waived his preliminary hearing. 1

More importantly, the Court of

Indeed, this Court may wish to take judicial notice of the Record in MartinezGonzalez, which reveals that there was in fact a preliminary hearing and the
district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing transcript in resolving
the motion to suppress or dismiss. Martinez-Gonzalez, Docket No. 37737, R.,
p.51 n.1. Also unlike the present case, Martinez-Gonzalez filed a motion to
suppress or dismiss, challenging the state's ability to use certain evidence at trial,
whereas Varela-Terna moved only to dismiss.
1
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Appeals in Martinez-Gonzalez did not discuss the scope of discretion under
I. C.R. 48(a)(2), much less state that the rule creates an exception to the

Supreme Courts holding in Stewart that waiver of a preliminary hearing
forecloses the ability to subsequently challenge probable cause for the charge.
To be sure, if !.C.R. 48 allowed for the discretion exercised by the district court in
this case, the Court in Stewart would have addressed the merits of the probable
cause ruling challenged on appeal. Instead, the Court "affirm[ed] the denial on
the correct theory." 149 Idaho at 388, 234 P.3d at 712 (emphasis added). This
Court should likewise affirm the district court in this case on the "correct theory"
that Varela-Terna could not challenge the probable cause for his arrest after
waiving his preliminary hearing.
Because Varela-Terna waived his preliminary hearing, he cannot show
error in the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss.

II.
Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Varela-Tema's Claim. Varela-Terna
Has Failed To Establish Any Basis For Remand Or Any Error In The Denial Of
His Motion To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
Varela-Terna "asserts that this case should be remanded for the district

court to make a finding of fact as to whether his car was upon the road in the
trailer park." (Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

Alternatively, Varela-Terna argues the

district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss, because, he claims his
"conduct was not a crime" since, according to him, "the road within the trailer
park was not open to the public."

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)
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Both of Varela-

Tema's arguments fail.

The record shows the district court made the requisite

factual finding and review of the evidence presented and the applicable legal
standards supports the conclusion that the road in question was open to the
public. If this Court reaches the merits of Varela-Tema's claim, he has failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss.

B.

Standard Of Review
"This Court reviews a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss a

criminal action for an abuse of discretion."

State v. Martinez-Gonzalez, 152

Idaho 775, 778, 275 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). In reviewing a
discretionarf decision, the appellate court considers whether the district court ( 1)
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the boundaries
of discretion and consistent with any applicable legal standards, and (3)
exercised reason in reaching its decision.

1st

The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law subject
to de novo review. State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 946, 265 P.3d 1155, 1158 (Ct
App. 2011).

C.

Because The District Court Found That Varela-Tema's Car Was Partially
On The Road, There Is No Need To Remand This Case For A Finding
Whether Varela-Tema's Car Was "Upon" The Roadway
The state charged Varela-Terna with driving under the influence in

violation of I.C. § 18-8004, which reads, in relevant part:
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol,
drugs or any other intoxicating substances . . . to drive or be in
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actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether
upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property
open to the public.
I.C. § 18-8004(1 )(a).

At the hearing on his motion to dismiss, Varela-Terna admitted he was
sitting in the "driver's side" of his car when law enforcement arrived and that he
was "pretty drunk." 2

(10/29/2012 Tr., p.6, Ls.20-24, p.12, Ls.17-18.)

Officer

Joshua Fielding confirmed that Varela-Terna was sitting in the "driver's position"
and that the car was running. (10/29/2012 Tr., p.29, Ls.6-25.) The only element
of the DUI charge Varela-Terna disputes is whether his car was "upon public or
private property open to the public." (R, p.44; see generally Appellant's Brief,
pp.7-18.) With respect to this claim, Varela-Terna claims, for the first time on
appeal, that the district court did not "make a finding of fact regarding whether the
car was upon the road," and requests this case be remanded for that purpose.
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) The record disproves Varela-Tema's claim.
In its Order on Motion for Dismissal, the court made the following finding
of fact: "a portion of the vehicle extended into the roadway area." (R., p.100.) In
that same order, the court later stated: "as noted above the Court found that the
back portion of [Varela-Tema's] vehicle extended beyond the dirt into the trailer
park's roadway."

(R., p.103.)

In the order's conclusion, the court reiterated:

Varela-Tema's "vehicle was in the trailer park's roadway." (R., p.104.)
Varela-Terna acknowledges the foregoing finding and conclusion of the
district court but nevertheless argues the court "did not make a finding of fact as
2

Varela-Tema's blood alcohol content was .212. (10/29/2012 Tr., p.12, Ls.1016.)
10

to whether Mr. Varela's car was upon the road within the trailer park, i.e., that the
car was touching and being supported by the top surface of the roadway."
(Appe!lant's Brief, pp.9-10.)
semantics.

Vare!a-Tema's argument is based solely on

That the court used a word other than ''upon" to find that Varela-

Tema's car was on the roadway is not legally significant and it in no way supports
a claim that the court failed to make a factual finding on the only issue that was
disputed. Indeed, the factual finding Varela-Terna claims the district court did not
make was the necessary predicate to the court's subsequent analysis of
"whether the parking lot of the trailer court is to be considered as private property
open to the public." 3 (R., p.103.) Varela-Tema's claim that the district court did
not make a factual finding regarding the positioning of Varela-Tema's car fails
because it is belied by the record. His request for remand should be denied.

D.

Even If This Court Considers The Merits Of Varela-Tema's Motion To
Dismiss Despite The Fact He Waived His Preliminary Hearing, VarelaTerna Has Failed To Show A Lack Of Probable Cause To Support His
Arrest For Driving Under The Influence
Varela-Terna contends the district court erred in denying his motion to

dismiss because, he argues, "Officer Fielding lacked probable cause that a crime
was being committed as to the 'upon public or private property open to the public'
element of the DUI statute." (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) More specifically, Varela-

3

Even if the court did not explicitly find Varela-Tema's car was partially on the
road, such a finding was implicit in the court's decision and may be considered
by this Court on appeal. See State v. Middleton, 114 Idaho 377, 757 P.2d 240
(Ct. App. 1988) ("[T]he failure of the trial court to make findings of fact, when
ruling on a suppression motion, does not automatically constitute reversible error.
Where, as here, there has been no request for findings by either party under
I.C.R. 12(d), our Supreme Court has stated that we should examine the record to
determine the 'implicit' findings which underlie the judge's order.").
11

Terna asserts "the road within the trailer park was not open to the public."
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)

Application of the law to the evidence presented

supports the district court's contrary conclusion.
For purposes of the DUI statute, "private property open to the public"
means "real property not owned by the federal government or the state of Idaho
or any of its political subdivisions, but is available for vehicular traffic or parking
by the general public with the permission of the owner or agent of the real
property." LC.§ 49-117(16); State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476, 479, 974 P.2d 1105,
1108 (1999) (holding definitions from Title 49 apply to DUI statute), abrogated on
other grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho
889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011 ). The Court in Martinez-Gonzalez, "clarif[ied] the two
steps necessary to determine if private property is 'open to the public' for
purposes of Idaho's DUI state."

152 Idaho at 784, 275 P.3d at 10. "First, the

private property must be 'available for vehicular travel or parking by the general
public."'

J.s:l

(quoting LC. § 49-117(6)) (emphasis omitted). "[T]he general public

does not mean everybody is welcome on the property all of the time, but simply
means an indefinite and undefined group of people."

Martinez-Gonzalez, 152

Idaho at 785, 275 P.3d at 11 (citing State v. Gibson, 126 Idaho 256, 258, 881
P.2d 551, 553 (Ct. App. 1994)).

Factors relevant to this step of the analysis

include "whether the property is business or residential and whether the area is
immediately accessible from a public sidewalk or street." Martinez-Gonzalez at
785, 275 P.3d at 11. If the property is a parking lot in a residential complex, the
court should consider "the size of the complex and whether the location is a
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common area."

id.

"Size and capacity of a residential complex is of

consequence because the larger the complex, the mom its users grow to an
indefinite and undefined group and the iess control a singie resident can exercise
over the common area."

&

The second step in the analysis is whether the property is "available to the
public 'with the permission of the owner."' Martinez-Gonzalez, 152 Idaho at 785,
275 P.3d at 11 (quoting I.C. § 49-117(16)). "The intent of the owner is evaluated
by observing limitations to access, such as the presence of physical barriers,
posted signs restricting the types of users, and whether there are expressed
consequences for entry."

Martinez-Gonzalez at 785, 275 P.3d at 11 (footnote

omitted).
The district court recited the foregoing factors and concluded the roadway
at issue was open to the public, emphasizing "the absence of any restricted
access." (R., p.104.) The court also found that each trailer within the park had
its own driveway, there were "no posted signs restricting access," "[t]here is a
posted speed limit of 10 mph and a stop sign for vehicles exiting the park," and
"[w]hile most of the trailer homes are owned by the residents, the lots are leased
from the owner of the park." (R., pp.99-100.) The evidence also showed that the
road is "immediately accessible" from a public street.

(Exhibits A, B and 3.)

These factors support the district court's conclusion that the road on which part of
Varela-Tema's car was parked was public property open to the public.
Varela-Terna claims otherwise, noting "the road within the trailer park did
not give access to a business" and "[t]he small scale of the trailer park also
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indicates that the road within the trailer park was not available for vehicular travel
or parking by the general public." (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.) These factors do
not tip the balance in Varela-Tema;s favor. Vv'hiie there is no separate business
such as a bar or a mall inside the trailer park, the trailer park is itself a business
in that the lots are leased from the owner of park. (R., p.100.) In fact, there is a
sign posted that advises: "All new tenants must sign in with the manager before
moving in."

(Exhibit 4 (capitalization altered).)

Certainly any member of the

public interested in leasing a lot from the manager would be free to drive and
park on the road either to look at the property or to speak to the ma·nager.

Vvith respect to the size of the trailer park, the court found "[tJhere are
approximately 13 trailer homes" (R., p. 99) and there was evidence that the park
also includes one residential non-trailer home, which is the manager's house
(10/29/2012 Tr.,

p.31,

Ls.12-18;

Exhibit A).

Contrary to Varela-Tema's

arguments, the size of the park does not support a finding that access to the
public was limited or restricted - especially in the absence of any signage
reflecting such an intent by the owner. In fact, it would not be readily apparent to
a motorist that the road on which Varela-Terna was parked was different than
any other residential road through a neighborhood, especially given the L-shaped
configuration of the road through the trailer park.

(Exhibit A.)

Varela-Tema's

claim that the district court erred in concluding the road was open to the public
fails.

14

Because the district court made the necessary factual finding and did not
abuse its discretion in determining the road through the trailer park was open to
the public, Varela-Terna has faiied to establish any basis for remand or reversal.

111.
Varela-Terna Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Sentencina Discretion
Introduction

A.

Varela-Terna asserts his sentence is "excessive considering any view of
the facts, because the district court did not adequately consider evidence of [his]
substance abuse problems." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Application of the correct
legal standards to the facts of this case show Varela-Terna has failed to establish
the district court abused its sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland,
125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

Varela-Terna Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Imposing A Unified Eight-Year Sentence With Two Years Fixed For
Felony Driving Under The Influence
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,

50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838
(2007)).

Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the
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burden of demonstrating it is a clear abuse of discretion.

State v. Baker, 136

Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

To carry this burden the appellant must show the

sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho
at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.

A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears

necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness."
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and
citation omitted). "When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court
will make an independent examination of the record, "having regard to the nature
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public
interest."

kl

Varela-T ema has been convicted of driving under the influence on at east
four prior occasions4 and he was on probation for felony driving under the
influence when he committed his current offense. (3/11/2013 Tr., p.57, Ls.5-6.)
Varela-Terna has had numerous opportunities for probation, but continues to
drink and drive. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Given Varela-Tema's history, he cannot establish
that an eight-year sentence with two years fixed is excessive.

Varela-Terna

argues otherwise, claiming the court did not "adequately consider evidence of

The presentence report reflects four prior DUI convictions (PSI, pp.4-5);
however, the prosecutor indicated at sentencing that Varela-Terna has "two more
DUl's, one from '95 and '94" which appeared to be omitted from the PSI due to
different spellings of Varela-Tema's last name (3/11/2013 Tr., p.52, L.21 - p.53,
L.20, p.57, Ls.1-12).
4
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[his] substance abuse problems."

(Appellant's Brief, p.20.)

The record

contradicts this claim.
In sentencing Vareia-Tema, the district court expressly recognized Vare!aTema has "an alcohol problem" and granted Vare!a-Tema·s request for retained
jurisdiction so he could obtain some treatment but was ultimately, and justifiably,
concerned about the need to protect society from Varela-Tema's repeated
criminal behavior.

(3/11/2013 Tr., p.59, Ls.4-8, p.60, Ls.1-6.) The court also

gave Varela-Terna another chance at probation at the conclusion of the retained
jurisdiction review period. (Retained Jurisdiction Order of Probation, filed August
8,

2013

(augmentation).)

Unsatisfied,

Varela-Terna

claims

"adequate

consideration of [his] substance abuse problems should have also led to a lesser
underlying sentence." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) To the contrary, the court gave
Varela-Tema's substance abuse more consideration than it was due.

As

explained by the Idaho Supreme in State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 727, 170 P.3d
387, 392 (2007), the defendant's "serious alcohol problem" did not require a
reduction in his sentence for felony driving under the influence.

Rather, a

defendant's history of alcohol abuse and crimes related thereto "show the proper
exercise of discretion," not an abuse of discretion claimed.

1J:L That Varela-

Terna believes his alcohol problem should have resulted in a lesser sentence
does not establish an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Varela-Tema's
conviction and sentence.
DATED this 24 th day of December, 2013.

/'.

~-

I

/

( i

n

n
/1\~
1 : Ji /
I

/

JESSiCA
M.I LORELLO
.
Deput~rney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24 th day of December, 2013, seNed
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE AP PELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

JESSI AM. LORELLO
Depu\y Attorney General

18

